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Abstract. We present in this article a freestart collision example for SHA-1, i.e., a colli-
sion for its internal compression function. This is the first practical break of the full SHA-1,
reaching all 80 out of 80 steps, while only 10 days of computation on a 64 GPU cluster were
necessary to perform the attack. This work builds on a continuous series of cryptanalytic
advancements on SHA-1 since the theoretical collision attack breakthrough in 2005. In par-
ticular, we extend the recent freestart collision work on reduced-round SHA-1 from CRYPTO
2015 that leverages the computational power of graphic cards and adapt it to allow the use
of boomerang speed-up techniques. We also leverage the cryptanalytic techniques by Stevens
from EUROCRYPT 2013 to obtain optimal attack conditions, which required further refine-
ments for this work.
Freestart collisions, like the one presented here, do not directly imply a collision for SHA-1.
However, this work is an important milestone towards an actual SHA-1 collision and it further
shows how graphics cards can be used very efficiently for these kind of attacks. Based on the
state-of-the-art collision attack on SHA-1 by Stevens from EUROCRYPT 2013, we are able
to present new projections on the computational/financial cost required by a SHA-1 collision
computation. These projections are significantly lower than previously anticipated by the
industry, due to the use of the more cost efficient graphics cards compared to regular CPUs.
We therefore recommend the industry, in particular Internet browser vendors and Certifica-
tion Authorities, to retract SHA-1 soon. We hope the industry has learned from the events
surrounding the cryptanalytic breaks of MD5 and will retract SHA-1 before example signature
forgeries appear in the near future. With our new cost projections in mind, we strongly and
urgently recommend against a recent proposal to extend the issuance of SHA-1 certificates
by a year in the CAB/forum (the vote closes on October 16 2015 after a discussion period
ending on October 9).
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1 Introduction
A cryptographic hash function H is a function that takes an arbitrarily long message M
as input and outputs a fixed-length hash value of size n bits. They are crucial primitives
for countless security applications, from digital signatures and Message Authentication
Codes to password protection. One key security feature expected from a cryptographic
hash function is collision resistance: it should be hard for an adversary to find two distinct
messages M , Mˆ that hash to the same value H(M) = H(Mˆ), where hard means with
significantly less than 2
n
2 computations.
A very famous hash function construction, followed by most industry standards, is the
Merkle-Damg˚ard paradigm [Mer89, Dam89]: H is built by iterating a compression func-
tion h that updates a fixed-size internal state (also called chaining value) with fixed-size
message blocks. This construction is useful in particular for its simple security reduction:
if the compression function is collision-resistant, then so is the corresponding hash func-
tion. However, one can distinguish between several types of collision resistances for the
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compression function: a freestart collision is a pair of different message and chaining value
(c,m), (cˆ, mˆ) such that h(c,m) = h(cˆ, mˆ), while a semi-freestart has the additional re-
striction that the chaining values c and cˆ must be equal, i.e. h(c,m) = h(c, mˆ). It is very
important to remark that the Merkle-Damg˚ard security reduction assumes that any type
of collision (freestart or semi-freestart) must be intractable by the adversary. Therefore,
any type of collision break on the inner compression function should be taken very seri-
ously as it removes directly any security protection coming from the operating mode for
the hash function.
The most famous hash function family, basis for most hash function industry stan-
dards, is undoubtedly the MD-SHA family that originated with MD4 [Riv90] and continued
with MD5 [Riv92] (due to serious security weaknesses [dB91, Dob96] found on MD4 soon
after its publication). Even though collision attacks on the compression function were
quickly identified [dB93], the industry widely deployed MD5 in applications where hash
functions were required. Yet, in 2005, a team of researchers led by Wang [WY05] com-
pletely broke MD5 and real collisions could even be computed for the entire hash function.
This groundbreaking work inspired many further researches on this cryptanalysis direc-
tion. Even more worrying, Stevens et al. [SLdW07] showed that a more powerful type of
collision attack so-called chosen-prefix collision attack could be performed against MD5 and
later, based on the inherent weaknesses of MD5, Stevens et al. [SSA+09] managed to forge
a Rogue Certification Authority that in principle completely undermined HTTPS secu-
rity. This is yet another argument for a very careful treatment of collision cryptanalysis
advances: the industry should move away from weak cryptographic hash functions or hash
functions built on weak inner components (compression functions that are not collision
resistant) before the seemingly theoretic attacks prove to be a direct threat to security
(counter-cryptanalysis [Ste13a] could be used to mitigate some of the risks during the
migration).
While lessons should be learned from the MD5 case, it is interesting to observe that
the industry is again facing today a similar challenge. SHA-1 [NIS95], designed by the
NSA and a NIST standard, currently the most famous and probably most used hash
function as of today, is facing important attacks since 2005. Based on previous success-
ful cryptanalysis works [CJ98, BC04, BCJ+05] on SHA-0 [NIS93] (SHA-1’s ancestor that
only differs by a single rotation in the message expansion function), a team led again by
Wang et al. [WYY05a] showed in 2005 the very first theoretical collision attack on SHA-1.
This attack, while groundbreaking, remained theoretical for non-governmental entities as
the expected cost was evaluated to be equivalent to 269 calls to the SHA-1 compression
function.
Therefore, as a proof of concept, many teams considered generating real collisions for re-
duced versions of SHA-1: 64 steps [DR06] (with a cost of 235 SHA-1 calls), 70 steps [DMR07]
(cost 244 SHA-1), 73 steps [Gre10] (cost 250.7 SHA-1) and the latest advances for the hash
function reached 75 steps [GA11] (cost 257.7 SHA-1) using extensive GPU computation
power.
In 2013, building on these advances and a novel rigorous framework for analyzing
SHA-1, the state-of-the-art collision attack on full SHA-1 was presented by Stevens [Ste13b]
with an estimated cost of 261 calls to the SHA-1 compression function. Nevertheless, a
publicly known collision still remained out of reach.
Very recently, SHA-1 compression function collisions (more precisely freestart colli-
sions) for a 76-round reduced version were obtained [KPS15] with a start-from-the-middle
technique and a highly efficient GPU framework, requiring only a reasonable amount of
GPU computation power (about 250 SHA-1, which takes less than a week on a single card).
Because of these worrisome cryptanalysis advances on SHA-1, one is advised to use
e.g. SHA-2 [NIS02] or the new hash functions standard SHA-3 [NIS15] instead when secure
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hashing is needed. While NIST recommended that SHA-1-based certificates should not
be trusted beyond 2014 [NIS12] (by 2010 for governmental use), the industry actors re-
cently started to move away from SHA-1, about a decade after the first theoretical collision
attacks. For example, Microsoft, Google and Mozilla have all announced that their respec-
tive browsers will stop accepting SHA-1 SSL certificates by 2017 (and that SHA-1-based
certificates should not be issued after 2015). These deadlines are motivated by a simple
evaluation of the computational/financial cost required to generate a collision for SHA-1:
in 2012, Bruce Schneier estimated [Sch12] the SHA-1 collision attack cost to be around
700,000 US$ in 2015, down to about 173,000 US$ in 2018, which he deemed to be within
the resources of criminals.
We observe that while a majority of industry actors already chose to migrate to more
secure hashing algorithms, surveys show that in September 2015 SHA-1 remained the
hashing primitive for about 28.2% of certificate signatures [SSL15].
2 Our contributions.
In this paper, we exhibit for the very first time a collision for the full SHA-1 compression
function.
More precisely, we present a freestart collision attack on the SHA-1 compression func-
tion for a computation cost approximately equivalent to 257 SHA-1 evaluations.
Our work extends the start-from-the-middle freestart attack for 76-steps in [KPS15]
to 80-steps. We build further on the framework in [KPS15] to adapt collision attacks for
NVidia graphic cards, that have very high performance/cost ratio, and now incorporate
the auxiliary paths (or boomerangs) speed-up technique from Joux and Peyrin [JP07]. We
also leverage the cryptanalytic techniques by Stevens [Ste13b] to obtain optimal attack
conditions, which required further refinements for this work.
We emphasize that our freestart collision counts as the first practical break of all 80
steps of SHA-1’s compression function.
Table 2-1. A freestart collision for SHA-1
Message 1
IV1 50 6b 01 78 ff 6d 18 90 20 22 91 fd 3a de 38 71 b2 c6 65 ea
M1 9d 44 38 28 a5 ea 3d f0 86 ea a0 fa 77 83 a7 36
33 24 48 4d af 70 2a aa a3 da b6 79 d8 a6 9e 2d
54 38 20 ed a7 ff fb 52 d3 ff 49 3f c3 ff 55 1e
fb ff d9 7f 55 fe ee f2 08 5a f3 12 08 86 88 a9
Compr(IV1,M1) f0 20 48 6f 07 1b f1 10 53 54 7a 86 f4 a7 15 3b 3c 95 0f 4b
Message 2
IV2 50 6b 01 78 ff 6d 18 91 a0 22 91 fd 3a de 38 71 b2 c6 65 ea
M2 3f 44 38 38 81 ea 3d ec a0 ea a0 ee 51 83 a7 2c
33 24 48 5d ab 70 2a b6 6f da b6 6d d4 a6 9e 2f
94 38 20 fd 13 ff fb 4e ef ff 49 3b 7f ff 55 04
db ff d9 6f 71 fe ee ee e4 5a f3 06 04 86 88 ab
Compr(IV2,M2) f0 20 48 6f 07 1b f1 10 53 54 7a 86 f4 a7 15 3b 3c 95 0f 4b
As previously explained, recommendations on the retracting of SHA-1 are based on
estimations of the resources needed to find SHA-1 collisions. We represent these resources
both in terms of number of days on existing clusters with a certain number of recent
graphic cards (CPUs), as well as the cost of renting cheap equivalent computational power
on Amazon EC2 representing an amortized cost of operation including ownership, power
and maintenance. Our freestart collision attack can be done in about 9 to 10 days on a
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cluster with 64 GPUs, or by renting GPU time on Amazon EC2 for about 2K US$.4 Based
on experimental data obtained in this new work and the 2013 state-of-the-art collision
attack, we can project that a real SHA-1 collision will take between 49 and 78 days on a
512 GPU cluster. Renting the equivalent GPU time on EC2 will cost between 75K US$
and 120K US$ and will plausibly take at most a few months.
The impact of our work is therefore not only theoretical. Freestart collisions are col-
lisions for SHA-1’s compression function, that do not directly translate to collisions for
SHA-1, but do directly undermine the security proof of SHA-1. They represent an impor-
tant alarm signal that warns users to quickly move away from using this hash function. In
particular, we believe that our work shows that industry’s plan to move away from SHA-1
in 2017 might not be soon enough.
Outline. In Section 3, we provide our analysis and recommendations regarding the time-
line of migration from SHA-1 to SHA-2 or SHA-3. In Section 4 we give a short description
of the SHA-1 hash function and our notations. In Section 5, we explain the structure of
our cryptanalysis and the various techniques used from a high level point of view, and we
later provide in Section 6 all the details of our attack for the interested readers.
3 Recommendations
Our work allowed to generate a freestart collision for the full SHA-1, but a plain collision
for the entire hash algorithm is still unknown. There is no known generic and efficient
algorithm that can turn a freestart collision into a plain collision for the hash function.
However, the advances we have made do allow us to precisely estimate and update the
computational/financial cost to generate such a collision with latest cryptanalysis ad-
vances [Ste13b] (the computational cost required to generate such a collision was actually
a recurrent debate in the academic community since the first theoretical attack from
Wang et al. [WYY05a]).
Schneier’s projections [Sch12] on the cost of SHA-1 collisions in 2012 (on EC2: ≈700K
US$ by 2015, ≈173K US$ by 2018 and ≈43K US$ by 2021) were based on (an early
announcement of) [Ste13b]. As mentioned earlier, these projections have been used to
establish the timeline of migrating away from SHA-1-based signatures for secure Internet
websites, resulting in a migration by Jan 2017 —one year before Schneier estimated that
a SHA-1 collision would be within the resources of criminal syndicates.
However, as remarked in [KPS15] and now further improved in this article thanks to the
use of boomerang speed-up techniques [JP07], graphics cards are much faster for this type
of attacks (compared to CPUs) and we now precisely estimate that a full SHA-1 collision
will cost between 75,000 and 120,000 US$ renting Amazon EC2 cloud over a few months
today, in early autumn 2015. Our new GPU-based projections are now more accurate and
they are significantly below Schneier’s estimations. More worrying, they are theoretically
already within Schneier’s estimated resources of criminal syndicates as of today, almost
two years earlier than previously expected, and one year before SHA-1 being marked as
unsafe in modern Internet browsers. Therefore, we believe that migration from SHA-1 to
the secure SHA-2 or SHA-3 hash algorithms should be done sooner than previously planned.
Note that it has previously been shown that a more advanced so-called chosen-prefix
collision attack on MD5 (SHA-1’s predecessor) allowed the creation of a rogue Certification
Authority undermining the security of all secure websites [SSA+09]. Collisions on SHA-1
can result in signature forgeries, but do not directly undermine the security of the Internet
at large. More advanced so-called chosen-prefix collisions [SSA+09] are significantly more
4 This is based on the spot price for Amazon EC2 GPU Instance Type ‘g2.8xlarge’, featuring 4 GPUs,
which is about 0.50 US$ per hour.
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threatening, but currently much costlier to mount. Yet, given the lessons learned with the
MD5 full break, it is not advisable to wait until these become practically possible.
At the time of submission we just noted that in an ironic turn of events, the CA/Browser
Forum is currently (from Oct 2 – Oct 9, 2015) holding a discussion to decide whether to
extend issuance of SHA-1 certificates through the end of 2016 [For15]. With our new cost
projections in mind, we strongly and urgently recommend against this proposal.
4 Preliminaries
4.1 SHA-1
We start this section with a short description of the SHA-1 hash function. We refer to the
NIST specification document [NIS95] for a more thorough presentation. SHA-1 is a hash
function from the MD-SHA family which produces digests of 160 bits. It is based on the
popular Merkle-Damg˚ard paradigm [Dam89, Mer89], where the (padded) message input
to the function is divided into k blocks of a fixed size (512 bits in the case of SHA-1). Each
block is fed to a compression function h which then updates a 160-bit chaining value cvi
using the message block mi+1, i.e. cvi+1 = h(cvi,mi+1). The initial value cv0 = IV is a
predefined constant and cvk is the output of the hash function.
Similarly to other members of the MD-SHA family, the compression function h is built
around an ad hoc block cipher E which is used in a Davies-Meyer construction: cvi+1 =
E(mi+1, cvi) + cvi, where E(x, y) is the encryption of the plaintext y with the key x. The
block cipher itself is an 80-step (4 rounds of 20 steps each) five-branch generalized Feistel
network. Its internal state consists in five 32-bit registers (Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Ei). At each step,
a 32-bit extended message word Wi is used to update the five registers:
Ai+1 = (Ai≪ 5) + fi(Bi, Ci, Di) + Ei + Ki + Wi
Bi+1 = Ai
Ci+1 = Bi≫ 2
Di+1 = Ci
Ei+1 = Di
where Ki are predetermined constants and fi are Boolean functions (see Table 4-1 for
their specifications). As all updated registers but Ai+1 are just rotated copies of another,
it is possible to equivalently express the step function in a recursive way using only the
register A:
Ai+1 = (Ai≪ 5) + fi(Ai−1, Ai−2≫ 2, Ai−3≫ 2) + (Ai−4≫ 2) + Ki + Wi.
Table 4-1. Boolean functions and constants of SHA-1
round step i fi(B,C,D) Ki
1 0 ≤ i < 20 fIF = (B ∧ C)⊕ (B ∧D) 0x5a827999
2 20 ≤ i < 40 fXOR = B ⊕ C ⊕D 0x6ed6eba1
3 40 ≤ i < 60 fMAJ = (B ∧ C)⊕ (B ∧D)⊕ (C ∧D) 0x8fabbcdc
4 60 ≤ i < 80 fXOR = B ⊕ C ⊕D 0xca62c1d6
Finally, the extended message words Wi are computed from the 512-bit message block,
which is split into 16 32-bit words M0, . . . ,M15. These 16 words are then expanded linearly
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into the 80 32-bit words Wi as follows:
Wi =
{
Mi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15
(Wi−3 ⊕Wi−8 ⊕Wi−14 ⊕Wi−16)≪ 1, for 16 ≤ i ≤ 79
Both of the step function and the message expansion can easily be inverted.
4.2 Differential collision attacks on SHA-1
We now introduce the main notions used in a collision attack on SHA-1 (and more generally
on members of the MD-SHA family).
Local collisions. A main component of these attacks is the concept of local collision,
introduced by Chabaud and Joux in 1998 to attack SHA-0, SHA-1’s predecessor [CJ98]. The
idea underlying a local collision is first to introduce a difference in one of the intermediate
state words of the function, say Ai, through a difference in the message word Wi−1. For
an internal state made of j words (j = 5 in the case of SHA-0 or SHA-1), the attacker
then uses subsequent differences in (possibly only some of) the message words Wi...i+(j−1)
in order to cancel any contribution of the difference in Ai in the computation of a new
internal state Ai+1...i+j , which will therefore have no differences. The positions of these
“correcting” differences are dictated by the step function, and there may be different
options depending on the used Boolean function. Though originally, these were chosen
according to a linearized model (over Fn2 ) of the step functions.
The main obstacle when using local collisions is that the attacker does not control
all of the message words, as some are generated by the message expansion; an important
observation from Chabaud and Joux was to show how to chain multiple local collisions
along a disturbance vector in such a way that the final state of the function contains
no difference and that the pattern of the local collisions is compatible with the message
expansion. The disturbance vector is itself a message that has been expanded with the
linear message expansion relation, where every ‘1’-bit marks the start of a local collision.
As each local collision in the last three rounds contributes to the overall complexity,
one should use disturbance vectors that are sparse over these rounds. Initially, mostly
heuristic cost functions were used to evaluate disturbance vector candidates, like Ham-
ming weight of the disturbance vector (e.g., [BC04, PRR05, RO05, MP05, JP05]), sum of
bitconditions for each local collision independently (not allowing carries) (e.g., [WYY05b,
YIN+08]), and the product of independent local collision probabilities (allowing carries)
(e.g., [MPRR06, Man11]). Manuel [Man08, Man11] noticed that all interesting disturbance
vectors, including all disturbance vectors used in attacks in the literature, belong to two
main classes I(K, b) and II(K, b). Within each class all disturbance vectors are forward or
backward shifts (controlled by K) and/or bitwise cyclic rotations of each other (controlled
by b). We will use this categorization notation throughout this paper.
Manuel also showed that success probabilities of local collisions are not always inde-
pendent, causing biases into the above mentioned heuristic cost functions. This was later
resolved by Stevens using a technique called joint local-collision analysis (JLCA)[Ste13b,
Ste12], which allows to analyze entire sets of differential paths over the last 3 rounds that
conform to the disturbance vector. This is essentially an exhaustive analysis taking into
account all local collisions together, using which one can determine the highest possible
success probability, as well as a minimal set of conditions that achieves that probability.
Although a direct approach is clearly unfeasible with an exponentially growing amount of
possible differential paths, by exploiting the large amount of redundancy between all these
differential paths to a very large extent, this can be done practically.
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Non-linear differential path. A major improvement to the original attack entirely
based on local collisions, was brought by Wang, Yin and Yu in 2005 in the first theoretical
collision attack on the full SHA-1 [WYY05a]. Their idea was to use a non-linear model for
the propagation of the differences in the first few steps of SHA-1 (in the form of a “non-
linear” differential path) before using the linear model of local collisions from Chabaud
and Joux. Even though the probability of two random messages following the non-linear
path is extremely low, the attacker can use the freedom in the first 16 message words
M0...15 to ensure that this happens with probability one. Starting with a non-linear path
eventually allowed to create better attacks than what was possible by using a purely linear
view of the function.
Construction of non-linear differential paths was initially done by hand by Wang, Yin
and Yu. Efficient algorithmic construction of such differential paths was later made possible
in 2006 by De Cannie`re and Rechberger, who proposed a guess-and-determine approach
[DR06]. A different approach based on a meet-in-the-middle method was also proposed by
Stevens et al. [Ste12, HC].
Accelerating techniques. One can derive explicit sufficient conditions on state and
message bits for the differential path. Such sufficient conditions allow the collision search
to be entirely defined over a single compression function computation. Furthermore, they
also allow detection of “bad” message pairs a few steps earlier compared to verifying state
differences, allowing to stop computations on “bad” message pairs more early.
Another contribution of Wang, Yin and Yu was the introduction of powerful message
modification techniques, which followed an earlier work of Biham and Chen who introduced
neutral bits to produce better attacks on SHA-0 [BC04]. The goal of both techniques is
for the attacker to make a better use of the available freedom in the message words in
order to decrease the complexity of the attack. Message modifications try to correct “bad”
message pairs that only slightly deviate from the differential path, and neutral bits try
to generate several “good” message pairs out of a single one. In essence, both techniques
allow to amortize part of the computations, which effectively delays the beginning of the
purely probabilistic phase of the attack.
Finally, Joux and Peyrin showed how to construct powerful neutral bits and message
modifications by using auxiliary differential paths akin to boomerangs [JP07], which allow
more efficient attacks. Notably, their approach reuses local collisions as the base of the
auxiliary paths.
5 Attack overview
In this section we provide an overview of how our attack was constructed. At a high level
our attack construction consists of the following steps
1. Disturbance vector selection: We need to select the best disturbance vector for our
attack. This choice is based on results provided by joint local collision analysis (JLCA),
taking into account constraints on the number and position of sufficient conditions on
the IV implied by the disturbance vector. This is more fully explained in Section 5.1.
2. Finding optimal attack conditions: Having selected a disturbance vector, as explained
in Section 5.2, we need to determine a set of attack conditions over all steps consist-
ing of sufficient conditions for state bits up to some step, augmented by message bit
relations. We use non-linear differential path construction methods to determine con-
ditions within the first round. Using JLCA we derive an optimal complete set of attack
conditions that given the round 1 path leads to the highest possible success probability
over all steps, yet minimizes the number of conditions within this model.
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3. Finding and analyzing boomerangs and neutral bits: To speed up the freestart collision
attack, we exploit advanced message modification techniques in the form of general-
ized neutral bits and boomerangs. We sample partial solutions for the attack conditions
which we use to determine candidate boomerangs and neutral bits. No boomerang or
neutral bit may invalidate any of the attack conditions. We also use sampling to esti-
mate the probability of the boomerang/neutral bit interacting with particular sufficient
conditions in the forward and backward direction. Though we do not allow significant
interaction in the backward direction, we use these probabilities to determine at which
step the boomerang/neutral bit are used, as explained in Section 5.3.
4. Base solution generation: Before we can apply neutral bits and/or boomerangs, we first
need to compute a partial solution over 16 consecutive steps that can be extended using
neutral bits and boomerangs. We call such a solution a base solution, which consists of
state words A−3, . . . , A17 and message words W1, . . . ,W16. The cost for generating base
solutions is relatively low compared to the overall attack cost, therefore it is not heavily
optimized and handled on regular CPUs. This is further explained in Section 5.4.
5. Application of neutral bits and boomerangs on GPU : We extend each base solution
into solutions over a larger number of steps by successively applying neutral bits and
boomerangs and verifying sufficient conditions. Once all neutral bits and boomerangs
have been exploited, the remainder of the steps have to be fulfilled probabilistically.
This is computationally the most intensive part, and it is therefore implemented on
graphics cards that are significantly more cost-efficient than CPUs, using the highly
efficient framework introduced by Karpman, Peyrin and Stevens [KPS15]. More details
are provided in Section 5.5.
All these steps strongly build upon the continuous series of papers that have advanced
the state-of-the-art in SHA-1 cryptanalysis, yet there are still small adaptions and improve-
ments used for this work. Below we will more closely describe our procedures to show how
all these techniques come together for our attack.
5.1 Disturbance vector selection
One can compute the highest success probability over the linear part exactly using joint-
local collision analysis [Ste13b]. By further using the improvements described in [KPS15],
one can restrict carries for the steps where sufficient conditions will be used and obtain
the sufficient conditions for those steps immediately.
The sufficient conditions counts for the beginning of round 2, and the associated highest
success probability for the remaining steps provide insight into the attack complexity under
different circumstances. In Table 5-1 we give our analysis results for various DVs, listing the
− log2 of the success probability over steps [24, 80) assuming that all sufficient conditions
up to A24 have been satisfied, as well as the number of conditions on A24 and A23. The final
column represents an estimated runtime in days on a cluster consisting of 64 GTX970s
based on c[24,80), by multiplying the runtime of the 76-step freestart GPU attack [KPS15]
with the difference between the costs c[24,80) for the 76-step attack and the DVs in the
table.
For a full collision attack on SHA-1, the obvious choice here would be II(51,0) given
the results in Table 5-1. However, for a freestart attack we have more constraints, in
particular the IV differences are fixed as they have to cancel with the differences in
(A80, B80, C80, D80, E80). This impacts the estimated runtime as follows. If there are suffi-
cient conditions on A0 then the estimated runtime in the last column should be multiplied
by 2c23 , as the 76-step freestart attack not having sufficient conditions on A0 could ignore
step 0. Moreover, if those IV differences are not sparse enough or at the wrong place then
more neutral bits and boomerangs are likely to interact badly with the sufficient conditions
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Table 5-1. Disturbance vector analysis. For each DV, under c[24,80), we list the − log2 of the success
probability over steps [24, 80) assuming that all sufficient conditions up to A24 have been satisfied. The
columns c23 and c22 list the number of conditions on A24 (in step 23) and A23 (in step 22), respectively.
The final column represents an estimated runtime in days on a cluster consisting of 64 GTX970s based on
c[24,80).
DV Cost c[24,80) Cost c23 Cost c22 Days on 64 GPUs
I(48,0) 61.6 1 3 39.1
I(49,0) 60.5 3 2 18.3
I(50,0) 61.7 2 1 41.8
I(51,0) 62.1 1 2 55.7
I(48,2) 64.4 1 2 281.9
I(49,2) 62.8 2 3 90.4
II(46,0) 64.8 1 0 369.5
II(50,0) 59.6 1 2 9.9
II(51,0) 57.5 3 3 2.2
II(52,0) 58.3 3 3 4.1
II(53,0) 59.9 3 2 11.8
II(54,0) 61.3 2 1 31.4
II(55,0) 60.7 1 3 21.0
II(56,0) 58.9 3 2 6.3
II(57,0) 59.3 2 3 7.9
II(58,0) 59.7 3 2 10.5
II(59,0) 61.0 3 2 26.2
II(49,2) 61.0 2 3 26.1
II(50,2) 59.4 3 2 8.7
II(51,2) 59.4 2 3 8.5
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on the IV in the backwards direction. With not enough neutral bits and/or boomerangs
the attack cost will be significantly higher.
Taking into account a preliminary analysis of available neutral bits and boomerangs,
the best option appeared to be II(59,0). This choice actually leads to the same IV sufficient
conditions that were used in the 76-step freestart attack with DV II(55,0).
5.2 Finding optimal attack conditions
As described above, using joint local collision analysis we obtain sufficient conditions
for the beginning of round 2 and IV differences that are optimal (i.e., highest success
probability). What remains is to construct a non-linear differential path for round 1. For
this, we used the meet-in-the-middle method using the public HashClash implementation
[HC]. Though we tried both non-linear differential path construction methods, i.e., the
guess-and-determine method using our own implementation, and the meet-in-the-middle
method, we have found that the meet-in-the-middle approach generally resulted in fewer
conditions and that furthermore we could better position the conditions.
This round 1 differential path was used as input for another run of joint local collision
analysis. Though in this case over all 80 steps replacing the assumed differences according
to the disturbance vector with the differences in the Ai from the non-linear round 1 differ-
ential path, where changes in sign were allowed for sparse differences. In this manner joint
local collision analysis is able to provide a complete set of attack conditions (i.e., sufficient
conditions for Ai and linear relations on message bits) that is optimized for highest success
probability over the last three rounds, yet minimizing the amount of conditions needed.
JLCA will in fact spit out many complete sets that only vary slightly in signs. In fact,
for our selected disturbance vector II(59,0) it turned out that a direct approach is far too
costly and far too memory consuming, as the amount of complete sets grows exponentially
with the number of steps we desired sufficient conditions for. We were able to improve this
by introducing attack condition classes, where two sets of sufficient conditions belong to the
same class if their sufficient conditions over the last five Ai-s are identical. By expressing
the attack condition classes over steps [0, i] as extensions of attack conditions classes over
steps [0, i− 1], we only have to work with a very small number of class representatives at
each step, making it very practicable.
Note that we do not exploit this to obtain additional freedom for the attack yet,
However, it allows us to automatically circumvent random unpredictable contradictions
between the attack conditions in the densest part, by randomly sampling complete sets
until a usable one is found. We previously used the guess-and-determine approach to
resolve such contradictions by changing signs, however this still required quite some manual
interaction.
The resulting sufficient conditions on the state are given in Figure 6-1 and the message
bit relations are given in Figure 6-3.
5.3 Finding and analyzing neutral bits and boomerangs
Analyzing the boomerangs and neutral bits was done entirely automatically as described
below. This process depends on a parameter called the main block offset that determines
the offset of the message freedom window used during the attack. We have selected main
block offset 5 as this led to the best distribution of usable neutral bits and boomerangs.
This means that all neutral bits and boomerangs make changes to steps 5 up to 20, that
propagate to step 4 to 0 backwards and steps 21 up to 79 forwards.
Because the dense area of the attack conditions may implicitly force certain other bits
to specific values, we use more than 4000 sampled solutions for the given attack conditions
over steps 1 up to 16. These 16 steps fully determine the message block, and also includes
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the IV sufficient conditions and the dense round 1 non-linear differential path. For this step
it is important to start over for every sample. If one uses message modification techniques
to produce many samples then this would result in a very biased distribution where many
samples would only differ in the last few steps.
We analyze potential boomerangs that flip a single state bit together with 3 or more
message bits. Each boomerang should be orthogonal to the attack conditions, i.e., the
state bit should be free of sufficient conditions, while flipping the message bits should not
break any of the message bit relations. Let t ∈ [6, 16], b ∈ [0, 31] such that state bit At[b]
has no sufficient condition.
First, we determine the best usable boomerang on At[b] as follows. For every sampled
solution, we flip that state bit and compute the signed bit differences between the resulting
and the unaltered message words W5, . . . ,W20. We verify that the boomerang is usable
by checking that flipping the message bits breaks none of the message bit relations. We
normalize these signed bit differences by negating them all when the state bit is flipped
from 1 to 0. In this manner we obtain a set of usable boomerangs for At[b]. We determine
the auxiliary conditions on message bits and state bits and only keep the best usable
boomerang that has the fewest auxiliary conditions.
Secondly, we analyze the behavior of the boomerang over the backwards steps. For
every sampled solution, we simulate the application of the boomerang by flipping the
boomerang’s active message. We then recompute steps 4 to 0 backwards and verify if any
sufficient condition on these steps is broken. Any boomerang that breaks any sufficient
conditions on the early steps with probability higher than 0.1 is dismissed.
Thirdly, we analyze the behavior of the boomerang over the forward steps. For every
sampled solution, we simulate the application of the boomerang by flipping the boomerang’s
active message. We then recompute steps 21 up to 79 forwards and keep track of any suf-
ficient conditions that is broken on these steps. A boomerang will be used at step i in our
attack if with probability at least 0.9 it will not break any sufficient condition up to step
i− 1.
The neutral bit analysis procedure uses the same procedure to analyze the backward
and forward steps, with the following changes. After boomerangs are determined, their
conditions are added to the attack conditions and used to generate a new set of solution
samples. Usable neutral bits consist of a set of 1 or more message bits that are flipped
simultaneously. Let t ∈ [5, 20], b ∈ [0, 31], flipping Wt[b] may possibly break certain message
bit relations. We express each message bit relation over W5, . . . ,W20 using linear algebra,
and use Gaussian elimination to ensure that each message bit relation has a unique last
message bit Wi[j] (i.e. where i∗32+j is maximal). For each message bit relation involving
Wt[b], let Wi[j] be the last message bit involved in the message bit relation. If (i, j) equals
(t, b) then this neutral bit is not usable. Otherwise we add bit Wi[j] as to be flipped
together with Wt[b] as part of the neutral bit. As for boomerangs, we dismiss any neutral
bit that breaks sufficient conditions backwards with probability higher than 0.1. The step i
in which the neutral bit is used is determined similarly as described for boomerangs above.
The boomerangs we have selected are given in Figure 6-9 and the neutral bits are listed
in Figure 6-6.
5.4 Base solution generation on CPU
The auxiliary conditions for boomerangs and neutral bits are all added to the attack
conditions. Before we can apply neutral bits and/or boomerangs, we first need to compute
partial solutions over 16 consecutive steps. Since the selected neutral bits and boomerangs
cannot be used to correct the sufficient conditions on the IV, these have to be pre-satisfied
as well. Therefore, we compute what we call base solutions over steps 1, . . . , 16 that fulfill
all state conditions on A−4, . . . , A17 and all message bit relations. A base solution itself
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consists of state words A−3, . . . , A17 and message words W1, . . . ,W16, but for the next
step on the GPU, the message words are translated to the equivalent message words
W5, . . . ,W20 with the main block offset of 5. The C++ code for generation base solutions is
automatically generated based on the given attack conditions and auxiliary conditions. In
this manner, all intermediate steps and all tables can be hard-coded, and we can apply some
static local optimizations eliminating unnecessary computations where possible. Though
we do not exploit more advanced message modification techniques within these first 16
steps yet.
The base solution generation is only a small part of the overall complexity and is run
entirely on the CPU. Although theoretically we need only a few thousand base solutions to
be successful given the total success probability over the remaining steps and the remaining
freedom degrees yet to be used, in practice we need a small factor more to ensure all GPUs
have enough work.
5.5 Applying neutral bits and boomerangs on GPU
This is computationally the most cost intensive part, which is why we made use of more
cost-efficient graphics cards for this part. In particular, we used 65 recent Nvidia GTX970
[NVI] graphics cards that feature 1664 small cores operating at a clock speed of about
1.2GHz; each card costs about 350 USD.5 In [KPS15], the authors mention that a single
GTX970 can be worth 322 CPU cores6 cores for raw SHA-1 operations, and about 140
CPU cores for their SHA-1 attack.
We make use of the same efficient framework for Nvidia graphics cards [KPS15]. This
makes use of the CUDA toolkit that provides programming extensions to C and C++
for convenient programming. So for each step of SHA-1 wherein we use neutral bits and
boomerangs, there will be a separate GPU-specific C++ function. Each function will load
solutions up to that step from a global cyclic buffer; extend those solutions using the free-
dom for that step; verify the sufficient conditions; and finally save the resulting extended
solutions in the next global cyclic buffer for the next step. The smallest unit that can act
independently on Nvidia graphics cards is the warp, which consists of 32 threads that can
operate on different data, but should execute the same instruction for best performance.
When threads within a warp diverge onto different execution paths, these paths are exe-
cuted serially, not in parallel. In the framework, the threads within each warp will agree
on which function (thus which step) to execute together, resulting in reads, computations,
and conditional writes that are coherent between all threads of the warp.
The exact details of which neutral bits and which boomerangs are used for each step
are given in Section 6.
In the probabilistic phase, after all freedom degrees have been exhausted, we can verify
internal state collisions that should happen after steps 39 and 59, where there are no active
disturbances in the disturbance vector. This is still done on the GPU. Solutions up to A60
are passed back to the CPU for further verification whether a complete freestart collision
has been found.
We would like to note that in comparison with the attack on 76 steps, this work
introduces boomerangs and has a slightly bigger count of neutral bits (60 v. 51). As a
result, this required to use more intermediate buffers, and consequently a slightly more
careful management of the memory. Additionally, in this work there is a relatively high
proportion of the neutral bits that need additional message bits to be flipped to ensure
no message bit relation is broken, whereas this only happens twice in the 76-step attack.
These two factors result in an attack that is slightly more complex to implement, although
neither is a serious issue.
5 With the right motherboard one can place up to 4 such graphics cards in a single machine.
6 Intel Haswell Core-i5 3.2GHz CPU.
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6 Attack details
6.1 Sufficient conditions
We give a graphical representation of the differential path used in our attack up to step 28
in Figure 6-1, consisting of sufficient conditions for the state, and the associated message
signed bit differences. The meaning of the bitcondition symbols are defined in Figure 6-2.
Note that the signs of message bit differences are enforced through message bit relations.
All message bit relations, including those for later steps, used in our attack are given in
Figure 6-3 through Figure 6-5. The remainder of the path can easily be determined by
linearization of the step function given the differences in the message.
A-4: ........ ........ ........ ........
A-3: ........ ........ ........ ........
A-2: ........ ........ ........ .....^-.
A-1: 1...1... ........ ........ .0.....+
A0 : 01..0... ........ ........ .1...... W0 : x.+...+. ........ ........ ...+....
A1 : 11+^..+. ........ ....^... ...+.... W1 : ..-..-.. ........ ........ ...-++..
A2 : ..-11-1. 1......^ .....1+1 10.1.0.. W2 : ..+..--. ........ ........ ...-.+..
A3 : .0.0-001 1.^.10.. .+01.011 11^0.1.1 W3 : ..-..--. ........ ........ ...-+.-.
A4 : .1.11+-1 +^^^+1^^ ^011^^.- +++++-.+ W4 : ........ ........ ........ ...+....
A5 : .+.+.-++ ++++++++ ++++++++ .+0-1111 W5 : .....-.. ........ ........ ...+++..
A6 : .0.0.1.0 11.111.1 1110-010 0-1.10-+ W6 : x+..++.. ........ ........ ...-.+..
A7 : 1-.+.1.0 10100010 00000011 1+.-.0.+ W7 : ....-+.. ........ ........ ......+.
A8 : 0+.0.0.. ........ ......0. .+.-.0.1 W8 : x-...... ........ ........ ...+....
A9 : .+.0.0.. ........ ........ .0.+...^ W9 : x.-+.-.. ........ ........ ...-++..
A10: .+...... ........ ........ ...+.0.. W10: ..-+++.. ........ ........ .....-..
A11: ...-.... ........ ........ ........ W11: x.++++.. ........ ........ ...-+.+.
A12: ...0.1.. ........ ........ .....1.. W12: ..-..... ........ ........ ...-....
A13: .1...0.. ........ ........ ......!^ W13: ..+..+.. ........ ........ ...-++..
A14: +-...... ........ ........ ........ W14: x++.+-.. ........ ........ ...-.+..
A15: 1.1-.... ........ ........ ......!. W15: ....+-.. ........ ........ ......+.
A16: +.10.1.. ........ ........ ........ W16: x+...... ........ ........ ...-....
A17: 1.-..0.. ........ ........ .......^ W17: x.++.+.. ........ ........ ...+--..
A18: .+-.0... ........ ........ .......! W18: ..+.--.. ........ ........ .....-..
A19: .+.s.... ........ ........ ........ W19: x.+---.. ........ ........ ...-+...
A20: -...R... ........ ........ ........ W20: x.++.... ........ ........ ...+....
A21: -.+R.... ........ ........ ........ W21: ........ ........ ........ ....++..
A22: -...S... ........ ........ .......^ W22: x.---... ........ ........ ...+....
A23: .-..R... ........ ........ ........ W23: ....-... ........ ........ ...+-...
A24: -.rs.... ........ ........ ........ W24: .-+--... ........ ........ ...+....
A25: -.-r.... ........ ........ ........ W25: ....+... ........ ........ ...+.+..
A26: -...s... ........ ........ ........ W26: .+--.... ........ ........ ...+....
A27: -.-.r... ........ ........ ........ W27: x.+-+... ........ ........ ...++-..
A28: ........ ........ ........ ........ W28: x+-.-... ........ ........ ........
A29: ..-..... ........ ........ ........
Fig. 6-1. The differential path used in the attack up to step 28.
6.2 The neutral bits
We give here the list of the neutral bits used in our attack. There are 60 of them over the
7 message words W14 to W20, distributed as follows:
– W14: 6 neutral bits at bit positions (starting with the least significant bit (LSB) at
zero) 5,7,8,9,10,11
– W15: 11 neutral bits at positions 4,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16
– W16: 9 neutral bits at positions 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16
– W17: 10 neutral bits at positions 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19
– W18: 11 neutral bits at positions 4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15
– W19: 8 neutral bits at positions 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,14
– W20: 5 neutral bits at positions 6,11,12,13,15
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symbol condition on (At[i],A
′
t[i])
. At[i] = A
′
t[i]
x At[i] 6= A′t[i]
+ At[i] = 0, A
′
t[i] = 1
- At[i] = 1, A
′
t[i] = 0
0 At[i] = A
′
t[i] = 0
1 At[i] = A
′
t[i] = 1
^ At[i] = A
′
t[i] = At−1[i]
! At[i] = A
′
t[i] 6= At−1[i]
r At[i] = A
′
t[i] = (At−1≫ 2)[i]
R At[i] = A
′
t[i] 6= (At−1≫ 2)[i]
s At[i] = A
′
t[i] = (At−2≫ 2)[i]
S At[i] = A
′
t[i] 6= (At−2≫ 2)[i]
Fig. 6-2. Bitconditions
We give a graphical representation of the position of these neutral bits in Figure 6-6.
Not all of the neutral bits of the same word (say W14) are used at the same step during
the attack. Their repartition in that respect is as follows
– Bits neutral up to step 18 (excluded): W14[8,9,10,11], W15[13,14,15,16]
– Bits neutral up to step 19 (excluded): W14[5,7], W15[8,9,10,11,12], W16[12,13,14,15,16]
– Bits neutral up to step 20 (excluded): W15[4,7,8,9], W16[8,9,10,11,12], W17[12,13,14,15,16]
– Bits neutral up to step 21 (excluded): W17[10,11,12,13], W18[15]
– Bits neutral up to step 22 (excluded): W18[9,10,11,12,13,14], W19[10,14]
– Bits neutral up to step 23 (excluded): W18[4,6,7,8], W19[9,11,12], W20[15]
– Bits neutral up to step 24 (excluded): W19[6,7,8], W20[11,12,13]
– Bit neutral up to step 25 (excluded): W20[7]
We also give a graphical representation of this repartition in Figure 6-7.
Finally, we show how the neutral bits are packed together with the index of an (ex-
tended) base solution in Figure 6-8. Note that neutral bits on W17 are split between steps
18–20 and 21–25. Furthermore, the packing of steps 21-25 also includes some flip values.
6.3 The boomerangs
We give here the boomerangs used in the attack. One set is used with a first difference
in the message initially introduced at W10, to be used as neutral bits for step A28; the
second set uses a first difference at W11, to be used as neutral bits for step A30. There are 4
boomerangs in total, with initial difference at bits 7,8 of W10 and 8,9 of W11. In Figure 6-9,
we give a graphical representation of the complete set of message bits to be flipped for
each boomerang. It is easy to see that these follow the pattern of a local collision.
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- W0[4] = 0 - W9[29] = 1 - W18[27] = 1 - W29[28] = 0
- W0[25] = 0 - W10[2] = 1 - W18[29] = 0 - W29[29] = 0
- W0[29] = 0 - W10[26] = 0 - W19[3] = 0 - W30[27] ^ W30[28] = 1
- W1[2] = 0 - W10[27] = 0 - W19[4] = 1 - W30[30] = 1
- W1[3] = 0 - W10[28] = 0 - W19[26] = 1 - W31[2] = 0
- W1[4] = 1 - W10[29] = 1 - W19[27] = 1 - W31[3] = 0
- W1[26] = 1 - W11[1] = 0 - W19[28] = 1 - W31[28] = 0
- W1[29] = 1 - W11[3] = 0 - W19[29] = 0 - W31[29] = 0
- W2[2] = 0 - W11[4] = 1 - W20[4] = 0 - W33[28] ^ W33[29] = 1
- W2[4] = 1 - W11[26] = 0 - W20[28] = 0 - W30[4] ^ W34[29] = 0
- W2[25] = 1 - W11[27] = 0 - W20[29] = 0 - W35[27] = 0
- W2[26] = 1 - W11[28] = 0 - W21[2] = 0 - W35[28] = 0
- W2[29] = 0 - W11[29] = 0 - W21[3] = 0 - W35[4] ^ W39[29] = 0
- W3[1] = 1 - W12[4] = 1 - W22[4] = 0 - W58[29] ^ W59[29] = 0
- W3[3] = 0 - W12[29] = 1 - W22[27] = 1 - W57[29] ^ W59[29] = 0
- W3[4] = 1 - W13[2] = 0 - W22[28] = 1 - W55[4] ^ W59[29] = 0
- W3[25] = 1 - W13[3] = 0 - W22[29] = 1 - W53[29] ^ W54[29] = 0
- W3[26] = 1 - W13[4] = 1 - W23[3] = 1 - W52[29] ^ W54[29] = 0
- W3[29] = 1 - W13[26] = 0 - W23[4] = 0 - W51[28] ^ W51[29] = 1
- W4[4] = 0 - W13[29] = 0 - W23[27] = 1 - W50[4] ^ W54[29] = 0
- W5[2] = 0 - W14[2] = 0 - W24[4] = 0 - W50[28] ^ W51[28] = 0
- W5[3] = 0 - W14[4] = 1 - W24[27] = 1 - W50[29] ^ W51[28] = 1
- W5[4] = 0 - W14[26] = 1 - W24[28] = 1 - W49[28] ^ W51[28] = 0
- W5[26] = 1 - W14[27] = 0 - W24[29] = 0 - W48[29] ^ W48[30] = 0
- W6[2] = 0 - W14[29] = 0 - W24[30] = 1 - W47[3] ^ W51[28] = 0
- W6[4] = 1 - W14[30] = 0 - W26[4] = 0 - W47[4] ^ W51[28] = 1
- W6[26] = 0 - W15[1] = 0 - W26[28] = 1 - W46[29] ^ W51[28] = 1
- W6[27] = 0 - W15[26] = 1 - W26[29] = 1 - W45[4] ^ W51[28] = 0
- W6[30] = 0 - W15[27] = 0 - W26[30] = 0 - W44[29] ^ W51[28] = 0
- W7[1] = 0 - W16[4] = 1 - W27[2] = 1 - W43[4] ^ W51[28] = 1
- W7[26] = 0 - W16[30] = 0 - W27[3] = 0 - W43[29] ^ W51[28] = 0
- W7[27] = 1 - W17[2] = 1 - W27[4] = 0 - W41[4] ^ W51[28] = 0
- W8[4] = 0 - W17[3] = 1 - W27[27] = 0 - W63[4] ^ W67[29] = 0
- W8[30] = 1 - W17[4] = 0 - W27[28] = 1 - W79[5] = 0
- W9[2] = 0 - W17[26] = 0 - W27[29] = 0 - W78[0] = 1
- W9[3] = 0 - W17[28] = 0 - W28[27] = 0 - W77[1] ^ W78[6] = 1
- W9[4] = 1 - W17[29] = 0 - W28[29] = 1 - W75[5] ^ W79[30] = 0
- W9[26] = 1 - W18[2] = 1 - W28[30] = 0 - W74[0] ^ W79[30] = 1
- W9[28] = 0 - W18[26] = 1 - W29[2] = 0
Fig. 6-3. The message bit-relations used in the attack.
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W0 : . . 0 . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
W1 : . . 1 . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 . .
W2 : . . 0 . . 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 0 . .
W3 : . . 1 . . 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 . 1 .
W4 : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
W5 : . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 . .
W6 : . 0 . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 0 . .
W7 : . . . . 1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 .
W8 : . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
W9 : . . 1 0 . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 . .
W10: . . 1 0 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . .
W11: . . 0 0 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 . 0 .
W12: . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . .
W13: . . 0 . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 . .
W14: . 0 0 . 0 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 0 . .
W15: . . . . 0 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 .
W16: . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . .
W17: . . 0 0 . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 1 . .
W18: . . 0 . 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . .
W19: . . 0 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 . . .
W20: . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
W21: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 . .
W22: . . 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
W23: . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 . . .
W24: . 1 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
W25: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W26: . 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
W27: . . 0 1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 1 . .
W28: . 0 1 . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W29: . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . .
W30: . 1 . A a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c . . . .
W31: . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 . .
W32: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W33: . . B b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W34: . . c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W35: . . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . d . . . .
W36: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W37: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W38: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W39: . . d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6-4. The message bit-relations used in the attack for words W0 to W39 (graphical representation). A
“0” or “1” character represents a bit unconditionally set to 0 or 1. A pair of two letters x means that the
two bits have the same value. A pair of two letters x and X means that the two bits have different values.
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W40: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W41: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . w . . . .
W42: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W43: . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u . . . .
W44: . . t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W45: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s . . . .
W46: . . r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W47: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . q p . . .
W48: . o o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W49: . . . n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W50: . . m l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . k . . . .
W51: . . J @ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W52: . . i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W53: . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W54: . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W55: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g . . . .
W56: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W57: . . f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W58: . . e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W59: . . $ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W60: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W61: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W62: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W63: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . .
W64: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W65: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W66: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W67: . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W68: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W69: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W70: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W71: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W72: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W73: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W74: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a
W75: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . z . . . . .
W76: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W77: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . y .
W78: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y . . . . . 1
W79: . % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . .
@ = jlMnpQRstUvw
* = hik
$ = efg
% = zA
Fig. 6-5. The message bit-relations used in the attack for words W40 to W79 (graphical representation,
continued). Non-alphanumeric symbols are used as shorthand for bit positions with more than one relation.
W14: ........ ........ ....xxxx x.x.....
W15: ........ .......x xxxxxxxx x..x....
W16: ........ .......x xxxxxxxx ........
W17: ........ ....xxxx xxxxxx.. ........
W18: ........ ........ xxxxxxxx xx.x....
W19: ........ ........ .x.xxxxx xx......
W20: ........ ........ x.xxx... .x......
Fig. 6-6. The 60 neutral bits. An “x” represents the presence of a neutral bit, and a “.” the absence
thereof. The LSB position is the rightmost one.
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A18:
W14 ........ ........ ....xxxx ........ (4 bits)
W15 ........ .......x xxx..... ........ (4 bits)
A19:
W14 ........ ........ ........ x.x..... (2 bits)
W15 ........ ........ ...xxxxx ........ (5 bits)
W16 ........ .......x xxxx.... ........ (5 bits)
A20:
W15 ........ ........ ........ x..x.... (2 bits)
W16 ........ ........ ....xxxx ........ (4 bits)
W17 ........ ....xxxx xx...... ........ (6 bits)
A21:
W17 ........ ........ ..xxxx.. ........ (4 bits)
W18 ........ ........ x....... ........ (1 bits)
A22:
W18 ........ ........ .xxxxxx. ........ (6 bits)
W19 ........ ........ .x...x.. ........ (2 bits)
A23:
W18 ........ ........ .......x xx.x.... (4 bits)
W19 ........ ........ ...xx.x. ........ (3 bits)
W20 ........ ........ x....... ........ (1 bits)
A24:
W19 ........ ........ .......x xx...... (3 bits)
W20 ........ ........ ..xxx... ........ (3 bits)
A25:
W20 ........ ........ ........ .x...... (1 bit)
Fig. 6-7. The 60 neutral bits regrouped by the first state where they start to interact. An “x” represents
the presence of a neutral bit, and a “.” the absence thereof. The LSB position is the rightmost one.
For steps A18--20
W14:a W15:b W16:c W17:d basesol:i
ccccccccc...bbbbbbbbbb..baaaaa.a
dddddd......iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
For steps A21--25
W17:a W18:b W19:c W20:d extsol:i
Additional flips:F
bbbbbbbbbb.b..F.d.ddd....d.aaaaF
F.Fc.ccccccciiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
Fig. 6-8. The packing of the neutral bits and the (extended) base solution index. A letter {a,b,c,d}
represents a bit on a given word, an “F” a flip bit, an “i” a bit of an (extended) solution index, and a “.”
an unused bit (only present to maintain a proper alignment).
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W10: ........ ........ ......BA ........
W11: ........ ........ .ba....D C.......
W12: ........ ........ ..dc.... ........
W13: ........ ........ ........ ........
W14: ........ ........ ........ .a......
W15: ........ ........ ........ ba......
W16: ........ ........ ........ .dc.....
Fig. 6-9. The local collision patterns for each of the 4 boomerangs. The first difference to be introduced
is highlighted with a capital letter. Note that boomerang “A” uses one more difference compared with the
other boomerangs.
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Software disclosure policy
To allow verification and improve understanding of our new results, we intend to release
our engineered freestart attack code for graphic cards. However, this source code does not
directly enable the engineering of a SHA-1 collision attack. Any cryptanalytic tools needed
for engineering a full SHA-1 collision attack will be released independently in a responsible
manner.
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